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Portfolio allocation strategies have always been subjected to numerous stud-
ies. It is well known that many economists and practitioners in literature
have attempted to describe asset allocation choices that might be good in
any situation or in any state of the world. A famous pioneering work in
Modern Portfolio Theory, written by Harry Max Markowitz in 1952, stud-
ied the eects of asset risk, return, correlation and diversication on proba-
ble investment portfolio returns. Basically, Markowit's contribution solved
a linear constrained optimization problem where the goal was to minimize
the risk of a portfolio given the portfolio expected return or maximize the
portfolio expected return given a certain level of risk. Even if the model
appeared to be reasonable from a theoretical point of view, several prob-
lems arose from its use in practice. In fact Markowitz's optimal portfolios
tend to concentrate on a small subset of the available securities, and ap-
pear not to be well diversied. After that a considerable number of models
have been presented among the last decades, such as the Black-Litterman
Model,1 which is able to incorporate investor's views in the optimization
process, and the Robust Asset Allocation,2 which provides a solution that
has the best performance under the worst case. Even more a large number of
investment strategies have been implemented over the years such as Stock
Picking, Market Timing and Portable Alpha. But despite their practical
success, mean-variance analysis and all the other tactical asset allocation
strategies rely on the assumption that investors care only about the distri-
bution of wealth one period ahead. This is highly unrealistic, in fact most
investors are interested in the standard of living that their wealth can sup-
port over the longer term. Investors must form beliefs about the future and
not just about average asset returns and risks, but about the dynamic pro-
cesses that determine interest rates and risk premia. These beliefs must be
consistent with some reasonable view about the equilibrium of the economy
and investors must calculate intertemporal hedging demand for assets along
the lines pioneered by Robert Merton.3 Obviously it is hardly realistic to
expect individuals to do all this by themselves. Even if a lot of tools have
been implemented to get high returns, both in the short-run and in the long-
run, nancial markets have often proved to be very uncertain and subjected
1See Black F. and Litterman R.: Global Portfolio Optimization, Financial Analysts
Journal, September 1992, pp. 28-43.
2See R. H. T  ut unc u and M. Koenig (2003).
3See Robert C. Merton, An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model. Econometrica,
Vol. 41, No. 5. (Sep., 1973), pp. 867-887.
1to many external shocks. Thus, achieving high returns could be very hard
and it often becomes a pure gamble, even for practitioners. In what follows
we will demostrate how allocating resources in nancial markets could be
not protable, especially for those investors who do not have sucient skills
to dynamically manage their own wealth, that we have named \naive in-
vestors". To prove this result it will be developed a sort of investment game
where we will compare, within a specic investment time horizon, the per-
formance of an equally weighted portfolio composed by ten dierent stock
indeces (belonging to dierent geographic areas) with the performance of
an equally weighted portfolio allocated by investing in the risk-free markets.
According to the main idea of our game we will also report other results,
by using dierent data, which will conrm the riskiness of investing in stock
markets.
2 Investment Game and Empirical Analysis
Our investment game represents an ex-post empirical performance analysis
between the stock markets and risk-free rate markets. The chosen invest-
ment time horizon starts in June 2002 and ends in December 2009. The
idea is that our representative investor deposits a certain amount of his/her
savings in a bank account investing either in the stock market or in the
risk-free market. In this game the stock market performances are captured
from the following global stock indeces time series: S&P 500, Euro Stoxx 50,
CAC 40, DAX, IBEX 35, AEX, FTSE 100, SMI, SSE and Nikkei 225. As
proxy for the risk-free securities it has been adopted the short term interst
rates, which are represented usually by either the three month interbank
oer rate attaching to loans given and taken amongst banks for any excess
or shortage of liquidity over several months or the rate associated with Trea-
sury bills, Certicates of Deposit or comparable instruments, each of three
month maturity.4 To get an overview of how investor's capital is performing
it has been assumed to compound the initial capital invested in each index
or risk-free security on monthly basis.5 To increase the value of the initial
4Source: OECD.
5Note that for the stock market performances it has been used the rate of change of
each monthly stock index time series and for the risk-free rate market perfomances it
has been retrieved the equivalent monthly rate of the per-annum hort-term interest rate.
Note also that investing in the risk-free market can be approximated to a investment in
a Time Deposit or Certicates of Deposit which are nancial product commonly oered
to consumers by banks, thrift institutions, and credit unions. They are similar to savings
accounts in that they are insured and thus virtually risk-free; basically they are \money
2amount of capital through the investment process, the investor would like
to invest a certain amount (in this game equal to $ 1000) at time t = 0.
This amount will not be moved until maturity, more precisly the portfolio
will be not reallocated.
Figure 1: Stock Index - Historical Data. Source: Datastream
As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, portfolio management
is built on the concept of diversication. Our main assumption is that in-
vestor does not have the knowledge to built optimal portfolios. It is also well
known that such knowledge consists of accurate information about the risks
and the returns of individual stocks. Variances and covariances are hard
to discover just by looking a couple of gures. Basically our representative
investor admit to know little about future risks and returns, thus resort to
passively indexed portfolios. The investor is more attracted by the stock
markets rather than the other one. Such a preference derives from the fact
in the bank" But they are dierent form saving accounts in that the Time Deposit or
Certicate of Deposit has a specic, xed term (often three months, six months, or one
to ve years), and, usually, a xed interest rate.
3that he/she suppose that stock markets will perform better than the risk-free
markets. For istance a naive investor's positive view on future stock markets
performance can be easily captured by looking at gure 1, which displays an
increasing trend. But past literature provides to our investor only a partial
support to his/her positive view on future stock markets performance. Ellen
R. McGrattan and Edward C. Prescott (2000) nd that the market value of
productive assets, including both tangible and intangible assets and assets
used outside the country by U.S. subsidiaries, is currently about 1.8 times
GNP, the same as the market value of equity. Thus they argue that the
US stock market boomed, especially in the 90's. Seeking an Answer to the
following question:\Is the current stock market value too high?" Glassman
and Hassett (1999) have argued that it is not. Furthermore, they have said
that the market is undervalued. On the contrary, others have expressed
concern that the market is, indeed, overvalued. Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan (1996), for example, has suggested that the recent high
value of the market may re
ect \irrational exuberance" among investors.
Shiller (2000) has reiterated this concern and said that a 50 percent drop
in the value is plausible. For istance, a general concern about an overval-
ued market is fueled by the experience of Japan in the 1990s. The value
of Japans corporate equity fell 60 percent in 1990, and its economy subse-
quently stagnated. In literature other empirical facts support the idea of
our investor to prefere stock markets rather that risk-free markets. Histor-
ical data provide a wealth of evidence documenting that for more than a
century, US stock returns have been considerably higher than returns for
T-bills. R. Mehra and E. Prescott (1985) show that the average annual real
return (that is, the in
ation-adjusted return) on the US stock market for
the past 110 years has been about 7.9%. In the same period, the real rate
of return on a relatively riskless security was a paltry 1.0%. The dierence
between these two returns, 6.9 percentage points (pps), is the well-known
equity premium. Also on this issue literature provides con
icting results.
Ravi Jagannathan, Ellen R. McGrattan and Anna Scherbina (2000) demon-
strate that the US equity premium has declined signicantly during the last
three decades. They show that the premium averaged about 7 percentage
points during 1926-1970 and only about 0.7 of a percentage point after that.
They argue also that such result is shown to be reasonable by demonstrating
the roughly equal returns that investments in stocks and consol bonds of the
same duration would have earned between 1982 and 1999, years when the
equity premium is estimated to have been zero.
In any case the choice of a pure equity portfolio is in line with the be-
haviour of a naive investor and with the purposes of our investment game. In
4Amount of cash to invest: $1000
COUNTRY Global Stock Indeces % Portfolio
CHINA Shanghai Stock Exchange
Composite Index (SSE)
10% $100.00
EU EURO STOXX 50 Index 10% $100.00
FRANCE CAC-40 Index 10% $100.00
GERMANY German Stock Index (DAX) 10% $100.00
JAPAN Nikkei-225 Stock Average 10% $100.00
NETHERLANDS AEX-Index 10% $100.00
SPAIN IBEX 35 Index 10% $100.00
SWISS Swiss Market Index (SMI) 10% $100.00
UK FTSE 100 Index 10% $100.00
USA Standard and Poor's 500 In-
dex (S&P 500)
10% $100.00
GLOBAL Portfolio 100% $1000.00
Table 1: Naive Investor's Portfolio Allocation
fact within this game investor decides to built an equally weighted portfolio
composed (see table 1) by purchasing shares of the most important global
stock indeces.The diversication nds place in the fact that the investor al-
locates 1=10 of its wealth in ten dierent stock indeces belonging to dierent
geographic areas. Even if each index refers to a dierent geographical area,
the portfolio as a whole can not be considered eciently diversied. The
lack of accurate information regarding future returns and risks, nancial in-
vestment theory, robust asset allocation, specic investment startegies and
integrated nancial markets pushes this naive investor also toward naive
diversication. In general naive investors acknowledge that they have no
useful information about stock markets' behaviour. The lack of above re-
quired knowledge and the absence of proper caution within the investment
process could result in heavy losses for our investor.
We have already mentioned that nancial markets are subject to high
volatility and for this reason we can not easily make money by composing
a pure equity portfolio and applying to its a passive investment strategy.
Roughly speaking the investors cannot wait until maturity, maybe watching
TV sitting on the coach, without monitoring the amount in his/her bank
account. If you do that, as our naive investor does this investment game,
you might be wrong. In absence of any asset allocation skills, the proba-
bility of not achieving a predetermined portfolio expected return increase.
Results show how investing an initial sum of money and coumpanding its
5Figure 2: Major Global Stock Indeces (Sample: June 2002 - December 2009).
Source: Datastream
until maturity either in the stock markets or in the risk-free market could
generate strange nal numbers. Keeping x the investment time horizon
at maturity (December 2009), the risk-free porto
io's return is higher that
the stock-market's portfolio return. According to our investment game idea,
from the pure equity allocation the investor obtains a return on initial in-
vested capital equal to 20.74% respect to a 21.12% that he/she could obtain
in case of a pure risk-free allocation. This conrm the madness of investing
in stock market without taking into account specic stock selection criteria
in order to built up a performing portfolio. Results also suggest that in-
vesting in the stock market it does not appear to be a simple game, but it
requires strong skills. Investing in stock markets has always been a serious
matter. Given the high level of uncertainty, in the last decade this issue has
become much more serious and in
uential than in the past. In order to pro-
duce a \wise" portfolio aimed at hedging risk and obtaining high expected
returns, we need to be well-informed about several issues, both theoretical
6Figure 3: Global Short Term Interest Rates Performances (Sample: June
2002 - December 2009). Source: Datastream
and practical. But usually we have no information about these issues. Ta-
ble 2 and 3 show the overall performances of the two portfolio allocations.
The rst thing to note is the large dierence in terms of risk. In fact the
equally weighted portfolio composed by stock indeces is much more risky
than the equally weigheted portfolio compose by risk-free assets. Assuming
that the risk (volatility) of the stock marktes is measured by the standard
deviation we recognize that the pure equity portfolio displays on average a
standard deviation equal to 70% (on annual basis). On the other hand the
risk-free portfolio should display a standard deviation equal to zero. We
use the conditional form just because of we use a proxy to get a risk-free
nancial instrument, thus even if in theory the risk should be equal to zero,
we get that for the risk-free portfolio the standard deviation is equal to 1%
(on annual basis). It is also important to point out that during the chosen
period the return of each selected stock index has been substantially low,
more precisly the data show a range which goes from a max of 1.14% (on
7COUNTRY Stock Index Mean Sd t(0) t(1) Delta %
CHINA SSE 1.14% 9.24% 100 189.13 89.13%
EU Euro Stoxx 50 0.12% 5.87% 100 94.74 -5.26%
FRANCE CAC 40 0.17% 5.56% 100 100.98 0.98%
GERMANY DAX 0.59% 6.91% 100 135.93 35.93%
JAPAN Nikkei 225 0.16% 5.80% 100 99.29 -0.71%
NETH. AEX -0.06% 6.80% 100 76.27 -23.73%
SPAIN IBEX 35 0.77% 5.59% 100 172.72 72.72%
SWISS SMI 0.20% 4.45% 100 109.47 9.47%
UK FTSE 100 0.26% 4.38% 100 116.25 16.25%
USA S&P 500 0.24% 4.51% 100 112.66 12.66%
GLOBAL Portfolio 0.36% 5.91% 1000 1207.44 20.74%
Table 2: Global Stock Indeces - Performance Analysis [t(0)=Jun 2002 and
t(1)=Dec 2009]
COUNTRY Risk-free Mean Sd t(0) t(1) Delta %
CHINA S.T.I.R. 0.22% 0.08% 100 121.59 21.59%
EU S.T.I.R. 0.23% 0.09% 100 123.51 23.51%
FRANCE S.T.I.R. 0.23% 0.09% 100 123.51 23.51%
GERMANY S.T.I.R. 0.23% 0.09% 100 123.51 23.51%
JAPAN S.T.I.R. 0.03% 0.03% 100 102.83 2.83%
NETH. S.T.I.R. 0.23% 0.09% 100 123.51 23.51%
SPAIN S.T.I.R. 0.23% 0.09% 100 123.51 23.51%
SWISS S.T.I.R. 0.10% 0.08% 100 109.29 9.29%
UK S.T.I.R. 0.35% 0.12% 100 137.15 37.15%
USA S.T.I.R. 0.23% 0.14% 100 122.85 22.85%
GLOBAL Portfolio 0.21% 0.09% 1000 1211.25 21.12%
Table 3: Global Riskless Securities - Performance Analysis [t(0)=Jun 2002
and t(1)=Dec 2009]
monthly basis) gained by the Shanghai Stock Index to a min of -0.06% (on
monthly basis) gained by the Amsterdam Exchange Index. Certainly such a
scenario should not encourage people to allocate their savings in a portfolio
composed only by risky assets. A careful reader might claim that our result
leads to the fact that we have chosen a specic investment time horizon and
a particular asset allocation, thus we stress the overall investment scenario
in favour to our purposes. This is true, but it is in line with our main
idea to build up an investment process where the principal actor is a naive
8investor with no sucient skills to manage \dynamically" his/her wealth.
To enhance and deepen our understanding of the riskless-risky trade-o in
the investment decision process we decide to replicate our investment game
using dierent data, geographic areas and 
oating investment time horizons.
Basically we restrict our analysis on two main areas: the US and the Euro
zone. The goal is still to compare the returns gained in case of \riskless"
investment to those gained by investing only in stock markets, considering
an intermediate-term horizon (5 years). The choice is done at the begin-
ning of the period, there isn't rebalancing in the meantime and eventually
the performances are compared. There is no diversication in this example:
this game claims to show that equity investment doesn't always outperform
\riskless" investments in an intermediate-term horizon, as a naive investor
could wrongly believe. In Euro area case study, our naive investor can in-
vest in three assets: a 5-year European bond, a short term interest rate
(Euribor 3 months) or Morgan Stanley EMU Total Return Index. There
are seven 5-year periods, as reported table 4; choosing a 5-year bond, the
investor locks the return over the investment horizon (we considered the
yield to maturity), so she gets certainly this return. Investing in the Euri-
bor rate the volatility is quite small and the return depends mainly on the
macroeconomic environment, in particular to the ECB Main Renancing
Rate (see gure 4 in appendix A). When the naive investor decides to invest
all her/his money in the equity index (MSCI EMU Total Return) she/he
believes to earn more than investing in \riskless" assets over 5 years, but is
it true? Not always. In three out of seven cases that's true, in particular in
the period Jan 2003 - Jan 2008 (+128.9%), but in some periods she/he gets
negative return, that is she/he loses money. Choosing riskless investment
the return is quite stable during the investment horizon, around 15-20%;
she/he wouldn't become rich, but she/he would earn in every period.
Sample Period 5yr GOVT. EURIBOR 3M MSCI EMU
Jan 99 - Jan 04 17.11% 19.15% -10.40%
Jan 00 - Jan 05 24.25% 18.12% -26.70%
Jan 01 - Jan 06 22.58% 15.51% -5.41%
Jan 02 - Jan 07 21.84% 14.12% 40.48%
Jan 03 - Jan 08 16.97% 15.24% 128.90%
Jan 04 - Jan 09 17.48% 17.97% 6.24%
Jan 05 - Jan 10 14.94% 16.91% 19.60%
Table 4: EURO AREA: Riskless Securities & Stock Market - Performance
Analysis
9Referring to the United States we extended the number of 5-year periods
analyzed: now they are seventeen. The investment game results become
more interesting: for the most part the MSCI USA performs better than
riskless investment (11 out of 17). But focusing on the last nine periods,
only twice MSCI USA performs better, whereas the investment in the 5-year
bond allows to get the best result ve times. Looking at the performance of
equity markets during the 90's, a naive investor would have chosen to invest
all her/his money in this asset class, but only two out of nine she would have
got higher return than riskless investment. This points out why investing in
capital markets can be very dangerous for naive investors.
Sample Period 5yr GOVT TBILL 3M MSCI US
Dec 88 - Dec 93 45.70% 32.05% 97.22%
Dec 89 - Dec 94 39.30% 26.99% 55.00%
Dec 90 - Dec 95 38.85% 24.44% 124.84%
Dec 91 - Dec 96 29.70% 23.95% 134.64%
Dec 92 - Dec 97 29.93% 26.00% 157.07%
Dec 93 - Dec 98 25.83% 28.29% 192.89%
Dec 94 - Dec 99 39.14% 28.81% 243.75%
Dec 95 - Dec 00 27.01% 29.25% 132.75%
Dec 96 - Dec 01 30.44% 27.16% 63.89%
Dec 97 - Dec 02 28.88% 22.79% -3.52%
Dec 98 - Dec 03 22.71% 18.19% -0.67%
Dec 99 - Dec 04 31.37% 14.34% -8.94%
Dec 00 - Dec 05 25.41% 11.28% 2.75%
Dec 01 - Dec 06 22.23% 12.74% 33.11%
Dec 02 - Dec 07 13.53% 15.92% 86.17%
Dec 03 - Dec 08 16.12% 16.38% -11.15%
Dec 04 - Dec 09 18.18% 14.95% 4.23%
Table 5: United States: Riskless Securities & Stock Market - Performance
Analysis
Table 5 is very explanatory: very high return investing in MSCI USA
during the 90's. This paper doesn't claim to analyze the \Roaring Nineties",
but that was a very particular period of economic growth thanks to the re-
duction of US federal budget decit, the decrease of interest rates (above all
in the long part of the curve), the process of deregulation, but it nished
with the burst of the bubble in 2001. Looking at past performances can mis-
lead a naive investor: this could have been the case looking at the Nineties,
10without knowing nancial and economic conditions of those years.
The idea behind our investment games, which states that a naive investor
should avoid to allocate his/her wealth in the stock markets, can be also
strenghtened by using other variables and sample periods. In the appendix
we collect other results where we use as proxies for the riskless securities the
JPM EMU GOVERNMENT ALL MATS. and the EURIBOR 3 MONTH
(for the EURO AREA) and the US BENCHMARK 10/30 YEAR DS GOVT.
INDEX and the US TREASURY BILL 2nd MARKET 3 MONTH (for the
US).6 The stock market is then represented by the MSCI EMU and by
the MSCI USA Indeces which are a market capitalization weighted indeces
maintained by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) respectively
for the EURO AREA and for the US, aimed to measures the performance of
stocks based in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)7 and
in the USA.8
What we have just depicted is a stressed scenario where the choice to
invest in risky (stock) markets can lead to severe disappointment. According
to that we simply introduce the role of the nancial institutions such as
banks, insurance companies, nancial advisors and consulting companies,
and ask to ourselves if such big players, which often induce investors to
enter into the stock markets, take into account particular scenario like the
one depicted by our analysis. If so, do they advise \naive investors" in a
fair manner?
6Note that the JPM EMU GOVERNMENT ALL MATS. and the US BENCHMARK
10/30 YEAR DS GOVT. INDEX have been managed as Total Return Index
7The MSCI EMU Index consisted of stocks in the following 11 developed-market coun-
tries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Portugal and Spain. The index contains almost 300 stocks and represents about
85% of the market capitalization in these countries.
8The MSCI USA Index is a free 
oat adjusted market capitalization index that is
designed to measure large and mid cap US equity market performance. The MSCI USA
Index is member of the MSCI international equity index series and represents the US
equity portion of the global benchmark MSCI ACWI (All Country World Index) Index.
113 Conclusion
We have seen that in specic time intervals a naive investor's portfolio allo-
cation can lead to unpleasant incidents. According to our results it is quite
easy to recognize that in several cases the investor is subjected to capital
losses rather that capital gains. This partially lead to the fact that investor
did not take into account a series of general rules to build up an optimal
portfolio that should be considered at the beginning of the investment pro-
cess. More specically these general rules are those referring to a \wise"
portfolio management strategy. With the term wise we mean a portfolio
allocation strategy where the investor is able to implement at least a market
timing strategy which does not require specic mathematical skills. In fact a
market timing startegy requires the ability to time the market, more precisly
to predict the future direction of the market. Even if some investors, espe-
cially academics, believe that it is impossible to time the market, on the
other hand practitioners, notably active traders, believe strongly in mar-
ket timing. What we have shown with certainty in our simple investment
game is that it's very dicult to be successful at market timing continuously
over the long-run. According to a theoretical and empirical asset allocation
framework the investor who doesn't have the time (or desire) to watch the
market on a daily, weekly or monthly basis, should avoid stock markets.
12A Appendix
Figure 4: EURO AREA - ECB Re Rate & Euribor 3 M. Source: Datas-
tream
13B Appendix
MSCI US TBILL 3M 10yr GOVT 30yr GOVT
1989 31.36% 8.55% 16.39% 20.19%
1990 -4.74% 7.88% 6.24% 4.34%
1991 21.15% 5.65% 17.34% 17.31%
1992 18.32% 3.55% 6.99% 7.53%
1993 9.95% 3.09% 11.83% 18.29%
1994 3.24% 4.38% -7.91% -12.00%
1995 38.19% 5.71% 23.72% 33.73%
1996 26.42% 5.23% 0.95% -3.56%
1997 29.63% 5.26% 9.83% 13.11%
1998 25.27% 4.96% 13.46% 17.44%
1999 21.17% 4.81% -7.98% -14.44%
2000 -6.43% 6.07% 13.99% 19.84%
2001 -10.98% 3.53% 3.11% 2.35%
2002 -23.68% 1.65% 15.69% 18.37%
2003 28.96% 1.03% 0.74% 0.57%
2004 11.08% 1.39% 4.58% 8.35%
2005 5.58% 3.23% 2.63% 9.68%
2006 15.32% 4.89% 1.47% -1.46%
2007 6.74% 4.51% 9.11% 9.12%
2008 -38.45% 1.43% 23.45% 45.65%
2009 30.31% 0.15% -10.25% -26.79%
1989-2009 564.30% 133.38% 312.94% 380.21%
Table 6: United States - Stock & Rf Markets: Performance Analysis (a)
14Sample Period MSCI US TBILL 3M 10yr GOVT 30yr GOVT
Dec 88-Dec 93 97.22% 32.05% 73.60% 87.12%
Dec 89-Dec 94 55.00% 26.99% 37.35% 37.02%
Dec 90-Dec 95 124.84% 24.44% 59.94% 75.61%
Dec 91-Dec 96 134.64% 23.95% 37.60% 44.35%
Dec 92-Dec 97 157.07% 26.00% 41.26% 51.84%
Dec 93-Dec 98 192.89% 28.29% 43.32% 50.76%
Dec 94-Dec 99 243.75% 28.81% 43.22% 46.57%
Dec 95-Dec 00 132.75% 29.25% 31.95% 31.35%
Dec 96-Dec 01 63.89% 27.16% 34.78% 39.42%
Dec 97-Dec 02 -3.52% 22.79% 41.97% 45.90%
Dec 98-Dec 03 -0.67% 18.19% 26.06% 24.94%
Dec 99-Dec 04 -8.94% 14.34% 43.27% 58.21%
Dec 00-Dec 05 2.75% 11.28% 29.00% 44.80%
Dec 01-Dec 06 33.11% 12.74% 26.95% 39.39%
Dec 02-Dec 07 86.17% 15.92% 19.72% 28.51%
Dec 03-Dec 08 -11.15% 16.38% 46.70% 86.11%
Dec 04-Dec 09 4.23% 14.95% 25.89% 25.75%
1989-1999 599.93% 77.56% 128.95% 141.37%
2000-2009 -5.09% 31.44% 80.36% 98.95%
1999-2009 15.00% 37.76% 65.97% 70.23%
Table 7: United States - Stock & Rf Markets: Performance Analysis (b)
15Figure 5: United States - Stock & Rf Markets: Performance Analysis.
Source: Datastream
16C Appendix
Year 10yr GOVT. EURIBOR 3M MSCI EMU
1999 -7.42% 3.07% 39.70%
2000 9.31% 4.55% -2.19%
2001 4.46% 4.41% -17.90%
2002 10.31% 3.42% -33.39%
2003 3.89% 2.39% 19.91%
2004 10.41% 2.18% 14.28%
2005 6.43% 2.23% 26.21%
2006 -1.33% 3.17% 21.93%
2007 1.67% 4.43% 8.54%
2008 16.30% 4.82% -44.35%
2009 0.46% 1.25% 28.66%
1999-2009 66.86% 42.32% 22.48%
Table 8: EURO AREA - Stock & Rf Markets: Performance Analysis (a)
Sample Period 10yr GOVT. EURIBOR 3M MSCI EMU
Jan 99 - Jan 04 21.15% 19.15% -10.40%
Jan 00 - Jan 05 44.48% 18.12% -26.70%
Jan 01 - Jan 06 40.67% 15.51% -5.41%
Jan 02 - Jan 07 32.87% 14.12% 40.48%
Jan 03 - Jan 08 22.47% 15.24% 128.90%
Jan 04 - Jan 09 37.10% 17.97% 6.24%
Jan 05 - Jan 10 24.74% 16.91% 19.60%
Table 9: EURO AREA - Stock & Rf Markets: Performance Analysis (b)
17Figure 6: EURO AREA - Stock & Rf Markets: Performance Analysis.
Source: Datastream
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